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Abstract According to the life cycle model of technological evolution, after the emergence of a dominant design,
technological product industries undergo an “era of incremental change.” This era of incremental change is not well
understood in the existing literature. Although the period is typically characterized in terms of stability and minimal
innovation, we find that the era of incremental change can be actually quite dynamic. Through our research into the
period of time following the emergence of a dominant design in automotive emission control systems, we find that
the overall product innovation in the industry did not decline immediately following the dominant design, and increased throughout the era of incremental change. Further, we find that firms maintain their attention on the same
core components that they innovated upon before the dominant design, but that these components make up less of
the overall proportion of total innovation throughout the era of incremental change. Finally, we found that the concentration of innovating firms in the industry increases immediately following the dominant design, and this concentration decreases over time throughout the era of incremental change. Findings imply a pattern of contraction and
expansion in the era of incremental change that extends previous work on the technological product life cycles and
helps to characterize the era of incremental change in a novel way.
Keywords
Dominant design, era of incremental change, technology life cycle, core components, automotive
emission control systems

1. INTRODUCTION
The early stages of new technological products are marked
by periods of intense innovation and competition among
contending product concepts until one emerges as the
“dominant design” in an industry (Anderson and Tushman,
1990). After a dominant design emerges, there is a period
of relative stability that has been characterized as the “era
of incremental change” (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).
During this era of incremental change, the product architecture remains stable and firms transfer their attention
from the overall product to innovation associated with
manufacturing processes, cost reductions, component improvements, and customer segmentation (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Funk 2003). The era of incremental
change is marked by organizational, social, and political
stabilization (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) that stands in
stark contrast to the innovative turmoil and intense standards battles that precede the dominant design (Suarez,
2004). Essentially, the level of technological innovation
diminishes as firms focus on other areas of improvement
(process, customer segmentation, etc.); the type of technological innovation shifts to lower (and presumably less
impactful) component levels; and the concentration of
firms doing the innovating increases and stabilizes
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Rosenkopf,
1
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1992; Murmann and Frenken, 2006). What happens after a
dominant design emerges is often seen as theoretically “uninteresting” by researchers (Dokko et al., 2012, p.682) – at
least until the next technological disruption.
Recent research has found, however, that this neglected period in technological life cycles can be quite interesting – and is not as stable and incremental as was previously thought (Murmann and Frenken. 2006; Funk. 2009;
Dokko et al., 2012). Take, for example, the case of the catalytic converter in automotive emission systems. In the
1970s there was an intense battle between competing
standards intended to reduce pollutants from cars and fit
regulatory emissions standards. Two different physical
designs (dual converter and three-way) and two types of
catalysts (pelleted and monolithic) were vying for the
standard until the market settled on the on monolithic
three-way converter architecture that has been standard for
more than thirty years (Mondt, 2000; Heck and Farruto,
2002). Automotive emissions stabilized on a dominant
design in 1981, and in the first twenty years after this dominant design emerged, patenting activity associated with
emissions increased significantly, overall performance of
emissions technologies improved by a factor of three, and
the digital revolution was leveraged to enable unprecedented emissions control and tuning (King and Lyytinen, 2005;
Lee et al., 2011; Lee and Berente, 2012). This level of innovation can hardly be ignored by researchers of technology innovation, and causes us to question whether the tech-
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nological innovativeness of the era of incremental change
is, in fact, necessarily less than the time preceding the
emergence of the dominant design (as posited by Anderson
and Tushman, 1990). Also, with the focus on other innovations and improvements, does the low level of technological innovation (associated with products after a dominant
design) necessarily remain stable throughout the era of
incremental change? Further, given that organizational,
social, and political dynamics may not stabilize in the same
way that they are often characterized in the era of incremental change (Dokko et al., 2012), might the concentration of firms innovating in an industry be in greater flux
than previously thought?
To address these questions and thus contribute to
the literature on evolutionary lifecycles of technologies, we
studied the period of time associated with the emergence of
a dominant design in automotive emission control systems.
We analyze patent data for the period from 1970 to 1994
and compare pre and post dominant design patterns of activity. These comparisons include: (1) the overall level of
technological innovation; (2) the relative proportion of
different types of component innovations; and (3) the overall concentration of firms innovating in the industry. We
find that, contrary to some of the previous literature, that
the overall rate of product innovation does not decrease
immediately following the dominant design – and it appears to increase throughout the era of incremental change
rather than stabilize or diminish. Also, firms do not immediately shift their innovative attentions away from “core”
components where they focused before the dominant design. However, the overall proportion of innovation comprised by these core components does decrease over the era
of incremental change. Finally, consistent with much of the
literature, we find that the concentration of innovating
firms increases immediately following the emergence of a
dominant design, but decreases over the era of incremental
change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we briefly review the literature on the product
life cycle model of technological innovation, followed by
the development of our hypotheses about the nature of innovation in the era of incremental change. We then present
our research into automotive emissions control systems,
and conclude with a discussion of our findings.
2. DOMINANT DESIGNS AND THE ERA OF INCREMENTAL CHANGE
The product life cycle model of technological innovation
(e.g. Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Utterback and Suarez,
1993) is the leading framework for research into the dynamics of product evolution over time (Murmann and
Frenken, 2006). According to this view, in the evolution of
technological products, there is an intense period of “ferment” whereby firms compete for dominance with their
versions of new product concepts, which culminates in the
emergence of a dominant design. A dominant design is a
2
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stabilized “operational principle,” or product architecture,
that gains a majority of the market (Murmann and Franken,
2006). Once a dominant design emerges, there is a calm
period of relative stability and incremental innovation until
the next disruption. The calm period, which is referred to
as the “era of incremental change” (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) has traditionally received relatively little scholarly attention.
The era of incremental change is marked by a shift
from product to process innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), accompanied by a general reduction of innovativeness and a focus on cost reduction and minor component and subsystem innovation (Anderson and Tushman,
1990). These efforts can be combined with product customization for differentiated market segments and other
forms of detailed, “lower level” problem solving (Funk
2003). Organizational, social, and political forces stabilize
around a particular product architecture (Tushman and
Rosenkopf, 1992), and firms narrow their attention to more
intensely address the component technologies associated
with dominant design (as opposed to innovating on the
architecture, see Henderson and Clark, 1990). Because the
era of incremental change is generally thought to deal with
minor changes and fairly stable phenomena, the bulk of
research into the technology life cycles has historically
focused on technological (architectural) discontinuities and
the battles for dominant design (Suarez, 2003), and often
ignores the era of incremental change.
Recent work, however, has found that the era of incremental innovation is not quite so stable and uninteresting as it was (perhaps) previously thought. Incremental
component innovations are often the source of the discontinuities in product architectures that result in disruptive
innovations (Funk, 2009). Social and political elements of
industries continue to be in a state of flux throughout the
era of incremental innovation (Dokko et al., 2012). Many
industries – particularly digitally intensive industries - do
not exhibit the stability (associated with inverted “U”
shaped innovation cycles) that life cycle theory implies
(Murmann and Frenken, 2006). Further, firms with products associated with a dominant design do not necessarily
reduce the scope of their technology innovation efforts –
many maintain capabilities and continue to innovate across
product levels and relevant components (Brusoni et al.,
2001).
Although the era of incremental change may not be so
stable and “uninteresting” (Dokko et al., 2012), there are
some points upon which the literature broadly agrees. For
example, when a dominant design emerges for a given
product, uncertainty is reduced with respect to product
architectures (the operational concepts and linkages between components) and firms do shift their attention from
architectures to different innovations associated with the
product (Murman and Frenken, 2006). Some of this atten-
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tion will focus on product innovation at a component 1 level
(Henderson and Clark, 1990), but innovative activities following the dominant design will also focus elsewhere such as on manufacturing processes. This means that the
overall product innovation in this period of time will be
significantly less than in the era before the dominant design, and the rate of such innovations will likewise diminish or remain minimal as this attention is spread across
these different objectives (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).
Further, market dynamics among firms will stabilize and
solidify around shared routines, which would limit the
number of new entrants (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992;
Murmann and Frenken, 2006).
Thus we have three dimensions along which we can
expect a difference between the era of ferment and the era
of incremental change: the level of product innovation, the
type of product (component) innovations, and the industry
composition (i.e. concentration of firms). Next we will
briefly attend to each dimension, followed by hypotheses
derived from the extant literature.
2.1. Level of Product Innovation
According to the traditional view, “most of the total performance improvement over the lifetime of a technology
will occur outside the era of incremental improvement”
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990, p.618). After the dominant
design emerges, there is a “period of inertia” characterized
by network externalities, lock in, and standard interpretive
frames that limit product innovations to the types that are
consistent with the needs of existing customers (Kaplan
and Tripsas, 2008). Once the era of incremental change
commences, the amount of product innovation is thought
to diminish in favor of other forms of innovation (i.e., processes, etc., Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson and
Tushman, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Funk, 2003).
Other forms of innovation – such as process improvement
– can be leveraged across multiple products and afford
greater return for firms in this period of stable product architectures (Klepper and Simon, 1997). Therefore, in the
period of time following the stabilization of a product’s
architecture (i.e., the emergence of the dominant design)
we would expect to see a lower level of overall product
innovation compared to the time preceding that stabilization. From this received view, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 1a: In a technological product industry, the
overall level of product innovation immediately following
the emergence of a dominant design will be lower than the
level of product innovation before the emergence of a
dominant design.
However, as indicated above, recent work has found
that the level of innovativeness in the era of incremental
1

For simplicity, in this paper we use the term “component” as a generic
term for any of the nested subsystems within a technological product
hierarchy (Murmann and Frenken 2006).
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change can be quite dramatic (Funk 2009; Lee and Berente,
2012). This recent work resonates with some of the case
studies that found innovations in the era of incremental
change to have a strong impact on product performance
(Iansiti and Khanna, 1995; Christensen et al., 1998). Particularly in digitally-intensive industries (Murmann and
Frenken, 2006), where the architectures are layered, openended, and generative (Yoo et al., 2010) we would expect
the initially reduced level of product innovation in an industry to increase over time following the emergence of a
dominant design. As large system integrating firms build
capabilities on components, their suppliers attempt to move
up the value chain and gain experience with architectures,
and lower level components become more interesting
(Brusoni et al., 2001; Funk 2009; Lee and Berente, 2012),
innovative activity on technologies should accelerate over
time during the era of incremental change. Thus we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b: In a technological product industry, the
overall level of product innovation increases over time
during the era of incremental change.
As far as the composition of this innovation, there is
widespread agreement that after a dominant design emerges, firms will shift their attention from the overall architecture to component innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990).
However, there is little research into the shape of this component innovation and which components will be innovated upon relative to each other and over time. Next we will
address the types of component innovation in the era of
incremental change.
2.2. Types of Component Innovation
Technological products are typically conceived to be
hierarchical systems, which are collections of nested, interdependent subsystems (components) coupled together
by linking mechanisms (Clark, 1985; Constant, 1987;
Hughes, 1987; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Murmann
and Tushman, 2006). Firms cannot attend equally to each
component, so their attention shifts across the product hierarchy over time as they collectively go about “working
through” different components and solving key problems
(Clark, 1985; pg. 243). Some of these components are
more functionally significant than others, and these significant components can be expected to gain much of the early
attention for technological development (Clark, 1985).
Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) describe more functionally significant components as “core” to a technology, and
other, less significant components as “peripheral.” Core
components are central to the operational principle of the
product and peripheral components support the functions
of the core components (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992).
Murmann and Frenken (2006) use the biological concept of
“pleiotropy” to distinguish between core and peripheral
components of a technological product. Core components
affect many functions of the product (i.e., high pleiotropy -
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such as genotypes in biology), whereas peripheral components support the core components, and have relatively
fewer functions (i.e. low pleiotropy – phenotypes in biology). Core components are the tightly coupled portion that
represents “a strategic performance bottleneck,” and peripheral components are those that are only weakly linked
to other components (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). A
technological product may consist of multiple core components, and it is important to note that core components of
any technological product may shift over time (Tushman
and Murmann, 2002). Components that were peripheral
before the emergence of a dominant design may become
increasingly important after product architecture has stabilized. Particularly in areas that involve digital technologies
(Lee and Berente, 2012), components that previously
served mainly to support other components, may evolve
into a significant role in product performance. We refer to
such components as “subsequent core components.” A
subsequent core component is a formerly peripheral component that takes a more central role in the performance of
a product after the emergence of a dominant design. We
contrast a subsequent core component with a “preceding
core components” – the core components that were central
to the product architecture before the dominant design.
In general, if one thinks of products as hierarchical
systems, firms would generally shift their attention from
the architecture overall to focus on the innovation of components of the product (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Core
components are central elements of product architectures,
and are therefore important to the competition between
architectural platforms (Utterback and Suarez, 1993), but
are only one of many points of competition once the architecture has stabilized. So we would expect the level of innovative activity to be high for such components before the
emergence of the dominant design. After the dominant
design emerges, however, firms shift their attention from
architecture to more diverse components in associated with
the product (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Anderson and
Tushman, 1990). Thus we would expect that subsequent
core components (those that were formerly peripheral)
would take a proportionally greater share of the organizational attention to product innovation in the years following the emergence of a dominant design, as firms shift their
attention from preceding core components. Accordingly,
we would expect the following:
Hypothesis 2a: In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will account for less of an overall
proportion (or share) of component innovations immediately following the emergence of a dominant design.
Further, Tushman and Murmann claim that “once a
particular core subsystem [component] closes on a dominant design, the product’s strategic action moves to another
core subsystem [component] or another key dimension of
merit” (2002; pg. 332). As the bottlenecks from one component are reduced, firms shift their attention to the next
4
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bottleneck, which becomes the focus of their innovative
activity (Clark 1985; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). The
core componente important to the formation of the dominant design will then stabilize, and the attention will shift
to (what were, perhaps, formerly) peripheral components.
These peripheral components will benefit from selfreinforcing feedback associated with the building of capabilities within each of the components and across ever-new
components and their linkages (Iansiti, 1998; Brusoni et al.,
2001). Overall this will result in increasing levels of innovation over time on those peripheral components as these
capabilities strengthen. Thus we expect:
Hypothesis 2b: In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will account for a decreasing
proportion (or share) of component innovations over time
during the era of incremental change.
After a product architecture stabilizes (i.e., a dominant
design emerges) firms shift their attention to other elements of a product hierarchy (Clark, 1985; Henderson and
Clark, 1990). Large system integrators in the industry focus their attention widely across the product architecture –
innovating on all sorts of components (Brusoni et al., 2001)
including both preceding and subsequent core components
(as well as peripheral components that remain peripheral).
However, this shift in firms’ attention is not necessarily
uniform. Certain components – those that are increasingly
important – can be expected to receive more attention.
What we refer to as “subsequent core components” (components that were previously peripheral but have become
more central to the architecture over time, see Tushman
and Murmann, 2002) would potentially be more important
than other peripheral components, and firms in the industry
would look to build capabilities in such components to
remain competitive. Further, although new entrants must
overcome significant R&D barriers associated with ‘preceding’ core components which are established by the incumbents’ accumulated patents and product knowledge
(Mueller and Tilton, 1969; Suarez and Utterback, 1995;
Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008), these barriers will not be as
entrenched for subsequent core components. New entrants
would not be quite as disadvantaged in forming competencies around emerging core components that were not previously central to the architecture – the routines and patterns of activity are not yet strongly established (Kaplan
and Tripsas, 2008) among subsequent core components (as
compared to ‘preceding’ core components). Therefore, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2c: In a technological product industry, ‘subsequent’ core components will account for an increasing
proportion (or share) of component innovations over time
during the era of incremental change.
This hypothesis relies, to a large extent on the nature
of competition in and industry and barriers to entry associ-
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ated with the emergence of a dominant design (Kaplan and
Tripsas, 2008). Next we address certain related industry
dynamics with respect to the concentration of firms in an
industry.
2.3. Concentration of Firms
As indicated above, the era of incremental change is traditionally thought to involve a greater concentration of firms
in an industry (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). This period
of time is marked by organizational, social and political
stability where routines and patterns of activity become
entrenched and reinforced (Tushman and Rosenkopf,
1992), thus offering an advantage to incumbent firms
(Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Firms associated with the
dominant design “win” the battles and thus reap the rewards (Suarez, 2004) and the unsuccessful firms attempt to
adapt to the new situation. These unsuccessful firms have
knowledge invested in the architectures that may now be
obsolete and it is no small effort to adapt and gain the new
knowledge necessary to compete (Christensen et al., 1998).
Therefore less agile firms end up falling out the industry,
resulting in a general increase in the concentration of firms
that remain. Fewer firms will be innovating in the era of
incremental change - at least in the early years of the era of
incremental change. From this we propose:
Hypothesis 3a: In a technological product industry, the
concentration of firms innovating immediately following
the emergence of a dominant design will be higher than the
concentration of firms innovating before the emergence of
a dominant design.
However, it is important to note that stable product architectures are accompanied by reductions in uncertainty
and well-defined linkages that invite the entry of new firms,
which can also involve component-level innovation
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000). This implies that stable designs
might actually encourage the number of firms participating
in component innovation in a given industry. In addition,
with the increasing importance of subsequent core component innovations, the diverse capabilities required by a new
technological regime would provide opportunity for potential entrants to invest in R&D to exploit the new market for
technology (Arora et al., 2001; Greaker, 2006; Greaker and
Rosendahl, 2008). Similarly, as larger firms that integrate
technological products may increase their component innovation in the wake of a dominant design (Henderson and
Clark, 1990), they may do so with components that are not
necessarily in their core product offering - since large integrators need to maintain capabilities in a variety of interdependent components of technological products (Brusoni
et al., 2001; Lee and Berente, 2012). Also, given the gaining importance of subsequent core components, the component innovations from new industry entrants can have a
tremendous impact on product performance (Funk, 2009),
and the innovative activities of these new entrants cannot
be ignored. From this analysis we produce the following
5
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hypothesis about the concentration of firms in an industry
over the era of incremental change:
Hypothesis 3b: In a technological product industry, the
concentration of innovating firms decreases over time during the era of incremental change.
From our review of the literature on the era of incremental change for technological products, we developed
seven hypotheses about the level of product innovations,
type of component innovations, and the concentration of
innovating firms in a technological product industry following the establishment of a dominant design. We test
these hypotheses using data from the automotive emissions
industry. Next we will briefly address this research context,
followed by a presentation of our research.
3. INNOVATION IN AUTOMOBILE EMISSION
CONTROL SYSTEMS
The evolution of automotive emission control systems
(AECS) technology provides an appropriate context for
examining the era of incremental change that arises after
the emergence of a dominant design. In this case, the dominant design involves the standardization on a three-way
catalyst-based catalytic converter architecture in 1981,
which was followed by more than a decade of architectural
stability until the technological shift resulting from onboard electronic diagnostic control modules in 1994 (e.g.
Mondt, 2000; NESCAUM, 2000). Figure 1 depicts a simplified representation of the historical development of the
AECS technologies from 1970 to 1994. There are two
distinct periods: the pre-dominant design “era of ferment”
and the post-dominant design “era of incremental change.”
The period from 1981 to 1994 represents the era of incremental change.
3.1. Emergence of the dominant design in AECS technology
In the 1970s, the focus of innovation in the automobile
emission control system was on the catalyst technology.
High automobile tailpipe emission reduction requirements
mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1970
(1970 CAAA) led to the development of catalyst-based
emissions reduction technology known as the catalytic
converter. Initially, automakers attempted to satisfy emissions reduction requirements by modifying existing engine
architecture with technologies such as exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), thermal vacuum switch (TVS), lean and rich
thermal reactors, and air preheat systems (THERMAC)
rather than by installing an add-in type catalytic converter
which was costly and required extensive knowledge in
catalysts that automakers did not possess. To automakers, a
catalyst-based emission control system represented a competence-destroying technological discontinuity rather than
a competence-enhancing technological discontinuity
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Time frame of Analysis in Development of the AECS Technologies: 1970-1994

Era of Ferment

1970

Era of Incremental Change

1994

1981

CAAA 1970

Dominant Design
(3-way Catalyst)

Subsequent Technological Shift
(Onboard Electronics)

Fig. 1. Time frame of analysis in development of the AECS technologies: 1970-1994.

(Tushman and Anderson, 1986) because emissions reduction by catalyst technology would make most of their existing engine modification technologies obsolete. Honda’s
compound vortex controlled combustion (CVCC) engines
and Chrysler’s lean-burn engines, which satisfied the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 1975 intermediary
regulatory stringencies for hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon
monoxide (CO) reduction levels (Dexter, 1979; Doyle,
2000) exemplify automakers’ inclination to rely on their
existing expertise when faced with technological threats
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Cooper and Schendel,
1976). However, Honda’s CVCC and Chrysler’s lean-burn
engines failed to satisfy nitrogen oxide (NOx) reduction
requirements originally stipulated under the 1970 CAAA.
Add-in type catalytic converters eventually became the
only viable technical solutions for reducing all three pollutants: HC, CO, and NOx simultaneously.
Two different catalyst systems--pelleted and monolithic type catalysts--competed to gain wider acceptance
among automakers (Mondt, 2000; Heck and Farrauto,
2002). Another competition for dominance during this period came between the dual converter and the three-way
catalyst (TWC) system converter design (Mondt, 2000;
Heck and Farrauto, 2002). These two different converter
designs emerged primarily to satisfy NOx reduction standards. Firms were under pressure to develop the automobile
emission control technology with improved NOx control
capability that permits less than 1 gm of NOx per mile. Reducing NOx requires lean O2 concentration, while oxidation of CO and HC needs a higher concentration of O2,
which was a technical complication that proved to be a
major hurdle in the development of such catalysts. The
TWC system design eventually won favor because it was
capable of reducing all three major pollutants (HC, CO,
and NOx) simultaneously. Engineers found a narrow range
in the air-to-fuel ratio in which reduction of NOx and oxidation of CO and HC are simultaneously possible using
fuel injection and sensor technologies. Eventually, the
TWC converter technology using monolithic type catalysts
became the dominant design for automobile emission con6
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trol systems in 1981, satisfying the 90% reduction requirement originally mandated in the Amendments of the
Clean Air Act of 1970.
3.1.1. Digital controls as a ‘subsequent’ core component
The focus of innovation shifted, in part, to digital controls after the emergence of the catalyst-based dominant
design. Indeed, firms continued to make incremental innovations in catalyst technology such as developing more
durable catalysts that can withstand more severe driving
conditions. Yet, the focus of innovation on digital controls
grew significantly as firms recognized that the EPA would
introduce another set of amendments to the Clean Air Act
that required even more stringent automobile emission
reductions than those of the 1970 CAAA (Lee et al., 2011).
Firms eventually standardized on an advanced electronic
on-board automotive diagnostic module (OBD) in 1994,
and used OBD technology to satisfy new regulatory standard mandated under the Amendments to the Clean Air Act
in 1990 (1990 CAAA). The introduction of the automotive
OBD represents the emergence of a post-dominant design
subsystem-level technological shift (Lee & Berente 2012).
An electronic onboard diagnostic system monitors all parts
of the AECS including the main catalysts, thermal system,
and fuel injection system through emission system sensors,
and provides input signals to different part of the AECS to
ensure optimal operations (Mondt, 2000).
Figure 2 illustrates the progress in performance in
AECS technology from 1970 to 1994, as defined in terms
of percentage improvements in pollutant (HC, CO, and
NOx) reductions in grams per mile from the prior technology. The emergence of three technologies is shown in figure
2: oxidation catalysts, three-way catalysts, and advanced
electronic control modules. Each represents technological
discontinuity in 1975, dominant design in 1981, and the
post-dominant design technological shift in 1994, respectively. Each introduction was accompanied by significant
performance improvements. Prior to the emergence of the
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Percent improvements over previous technology

Performance Progresses in Automobile Emission Control Technologies

400%

Era of engine
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Fig. 2. Performance progresses in automobile emission control technologies

oxidation-catalyst-based catalytic converter, automakers
relied on engine modification techniques to reduce auto
emissions, and the introduction of catalyst-based auto
emission control technology in 1975 signified an emergence of a technological discontinuity, a new technological
approach for controlling auto emissions. As is shown in
figure 2, its introduction brought about significant performance improvement over the previous enginemodification-based auto emissions reduction technologies.
4. METHOD
4.1. Data
To study innovation in AECS, we identified relevant patent
data for AECS technology using the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) public database. The patent
database for AECS technology was built using both the
class-based and abstract-based keyword search methods.
We began with the class-based search approach, adopting
patent subclasses identified by Campbell and Levine’s
(1984) earlier study on catalytic converter technology.
Moreover, we complemented the patent class search by
pursuing an abstract-based search to ensure that we captured the entire set of emission control technologies for
automobiles. Although a patent-class-based search allows
for capturing a broad range of relevant inventions, outdated
7
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patent classes identified by an earlier study would not fully
capture the breadth of AECS technologies that have
evolved. The abstract-based search, which identifies relevant patents by using representative keywords, thus complements the class-based search. The abstract-based search
helped us identify relevant patents not found by the classbased search. For the abstract-based search we selected
seven keywords that represent AECS technologies - catalytic converter, emission, automobile, catalyst, pollution,
exhausts, and engine - and searched the USPTO patent
database electronically by using various combinations of
these keywords. We also closely examined the abstracts of
all identified patents to further screen for catalytic converter technology that does not belong to automotive applications from the database. Patent data has some limitations as
a measure of innovation, and patents certainly do not capture the entirety of innovation in an industry (Scherer 1983,
Griliches 1990, Acs et al. 2002; Kerr and Shihe, 2008).
However, patent as a data is highly correlated to the extent
of the firm’s innovation activities (Trajtenberg 1989), and
the automotive industry relies heavily on patenting. Further,
patent data, with all its limitations, does allow for a detailed longitudinal analysis of the process of technical
change in a way that few other datasets can (Almeida et al.
2002; Katila, 2002).
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Fig. 3. Patenting trend in two key subsystem technologies.

The total number of successfully applied patents
relevant to AECS technologies assigned to firms from
1970 to 1994 is 1,429. 2 We further categorized the carefully screened and identified AECS patents into three subtechnology categories - catalysts, digital controls, and
manufacturing - to specifically examine the era of incremental change. The AECS technologies that belong to catalyst categories include catalyst support materials, palladium three-way catalysts, and porous catalyst carriers. Those
that belong to the digital controls category included air to
fuel ratio control, EGR control, and various types of sensors. Manufacturing AECS technologies include the assembly method for catalytic converter and catalytic converter housing design.
The first author possesses deep technical
knowledge of the auto emissions control technology and
used his knowledge for categorizing AECS patents into the
three different categories. 3 Nevertheless, his patent coding
was cross-checked by an independent coder to establish
independent justification of the coding scheme. We used
the period from 1980 to 1994 for this study since this time
period captures the beginning of the development of the
AECS technology in 1970 to the emergence of a post dominant design technological shift in digital controls: the onboard diagnostic module in 1994 (marking the end of that
era of incremental change).

2

Detailed information regarding identified patents and corresponding
patent classes is available from the authors upon request.
The first author has extensive industry experience as an automotive
technical engineer in a major automaker.

3

8
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4.2. Dependent variables
There are three different dependent variables for this study:
(1) the level of product innovation (H1a and H1b), (2) the
proportion of different types of component innovations
(H2a, H2b and H2c) and (3) the concentration of innovating firms (H3a and H3b). We measured the level of product innovation using the number of successful annual patent applications in two key component [subsystem] technologies (catalyst and digital controls). These two component technologies are the ones that became the core components over the evolution of the auto emissions control
technology-- catalyst technology was the core subsystem
technology responsible for the emergence of the dominant
design in 1981 (catalytic converter technology, i.e., the
‘preceding’ core component) and digital controls technology was the subsequent core component technology responsible for the emergence of the onboard diagnostic system
in 1994. Patenting trend data in the two key component
technologies is plotted in figure 3.
The proportion of subsystem technology in a given
year was measured by dividing the number of subsystem
technology patents by the overall patent counts in the
AECS technology in that particular year. Specifically, we
measured the proportion for catalyst and digital controls
subsystem technologies.
To construct the concentration of innovating firms
measure, we used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
(Hall, 2005) as below:
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HHI of innovating firms =
where Si represents the patent share of firm i in the auto
emissions control technology field, and N is the number of
patenting firms.
4.3. Independent and control variables
We used two variables to estimate the dynamic effects of
the dominant design. First, we created a dominant design
dummy variable to capture the effect of the establishment
of a dominant design in 1981. We coded one for period
between 1981 to1994, and refer to this variable as the era
of incremental change. Second, we created a time trend
variable to capture the dynamic effects of the dominant
design during the post dominant design period, that is,
whether the dominant design effect increase or decrease
over time. This time trend variable is equal to zero from
1970 to 1980 and counts the number of years starting from
1981 when the dominant design was established. Therefore,
time trend variable indicates whether the size of the main
effect increases or decreases over time during the era of
incremental change.
We added a number of control variables: expenditure,
auto sales, patenting in auto electronics and patenting in
total auto technologies, to account for potential factors that
may also affect innovation in AECS. First, we included in
the equation capital expenditures for emission control for
light-duty vehicles (expenditure) to control for the potential impact of industry capital expenditures on innovation
in the development of the automobile emission control
devices. Because government regulations such as the Clean
Air Acts of 1970 and 1990 were among of the major factors influencing the firms’ R&D decisions (including the
industry capital expenditure in complying with the regulation particularly), expenditures effectively control for the
potential impact of the regulations on innovative activity.
Industry capital expenditures on automobile emission control devices are estimated using the data provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency and the California Air
Resource Board (EPA, 1990; CARB, 1996). Both the EPA
(1990) and CARB (1996) reports provide cost estimates
with a detailed breakdown of components of the emission
control systems such as evaporative emissions canisters,
exhaust gas recirculation units, universal exhaust oxygen
sensors, full electronic EGR system, close-coupled catalysts, electrically heated catalysts, leak-free exhaust systems, engine modifications such as improved piston ring
and head gasket design, and electric air injection system.
The EPA’s (1990) study reveals that by 1994, auto emission devices approximately cost an additional $475 per
vehicle to achieve 90% of tailpipe emission reductions
from the pre 1970 emission level. Further study using the
data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the
cost of the emission control system further increased due to
the phase-in of the Tier I standards in 1994 (Anderson and
Sherwood, 2002).
9
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We also controlled for potential market forces in the
development of the AECS technology by including a variable that captures US retail car sales (Auto Sales). We used
Ward’s automotive publication to obtain US retail car sales
data (Ward’s Auto, 2010). Firm innovation in the development of the AECS technology can be affected by an
overall innovation trend in the automobile industry – and
in this case there was widespread component innovation in
digital technologies and electronics in the 1980s and 1990s
due to the digital revolution. Thus, we also included the
total patent counts in automotive electronics technology as
a control (Auto Patents) to capture any potential effect that
patenting in electronics auto emission control technology
reflects overall patenting activities in automotive electronics technologies and thus do more to isolate the impact of
the technology lifecyle. We used the United States Patent
Classification (USPC) to obtain annual patent counts in
automotive digital controls technologies. Patent classes
used to search automotive digital controls technologies
include 307/101.1 (automotive transmission or interconnection systems) and 315/77 (electric discharge devices for
vehicles) 4.
4.4. Statistical method
Because the dependent variable for H1a and H1b (Product
innovation) consisted of patents of two key component
technologies, we used a negative binomial specification.
The negative binomial panel regression is well known to
account for the count nature of patent data and repeated
cross-sectional observation a period of time would be appropriate (Hausman et al., 1984). As the data for this study
consisted of a panel of observations for firm patenting activities over multiple years (1970-1994), a negative binomial specification is deemed appropriate. For regressions
that involve non-count fractional dependent variables (Proportion of innovation and Firm concentration), we used the
generalized linear model (glm) regression technique. The
generalized linear model is known to account for the properties of non-normally distributed variables such as proportion based on counts whose values fall between zero and
one (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). We also report results
with robust standard errors using the Huber-White estimator for variance.
To further build robustness into our analysis and complement pooled regressions, we ran additional firm fixedeffects panel regressions for H1 (Product innovation) and
H2 (Proportion of component innovation). The advantage
of using fixed-effects regression is that it controls for unobservable firm-level heterogeneities that are not accounted for in the regression model such as firms’ propensity for
patenting their ideas (Pavitt, 1985) and firms’ capabilities
such as technological investments and strategies (PennerHahn and Shaver, 2004; Arundel and Kabla, 1998). For the
fixed-effect panel regressions, we used the patent data of
4

Full patent classes used to search patents in auto electronics technologies
are available from authors upon request
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of variables used for analyses.
Variables

Description

Product innovation
Proportion catalyst

Successfully applied annual patent counts in two key subsystem
AECS technologies (Catalyst and Digital controls)
Proportion of innovation in catalyst AECS subsystem technology

Proportion electronics
Dominant design
Time trend
Catalyst

Mean

Expenditure
Auto sales
Patenting in auto electronics
Total auto patents
Innovating firm concentration

Max.

Min.

38.84

30.47

121.00

11.00

0.42

0.14

0.77

0.14

Proportion of innovation in electronics AECS subsystem technology

0.24

0.14

0.57

0.07

Period dummy variable coded as 1 since the emergence of dominant
design in 1981 and 0 otherwise
Time trend after the emergence of dominant design in 1981

0.56

0.51

1.00

0.00

4.20

4.89

14.00

0.00

20.40

9.70

41.00

7.00

18.44

24.60

91.00

1.00

528.75

278.70

843.34

14.50

7.25

1.27

9.66

5.05

99.68

51.55

223.00

39.00

904.52

271.16

1390.00

117.00

0.08

0.02

0.14

0.04

Innovation (patenting) in catalyst AECS technology from 1970 to 1980,
and zero otherwise
Innovation (patenting) in digital controls AECS technology from 1981
to 1998, and zero otherwise
Capital expenditures on automotive emission control devices per car
(in 2000 US$)
6
Total annual auto sales in U.S. (×10 )

Digital controls

S.D.

Successful total annual patent applications in automotive electronics
technology
Successful total annual U.S. patent applications in automotive technologies
Innovating (patenting) firm concentration

Table 2
Correlations matrix.
Variables

n = 1429
1

2

1.
Time trend
2.
Catalyst
0.34*
3.
Digital controls
0.67*
0.48*
4.
Expenditure
0.73*
-0.12
5.
Auto sales
-0.56*
0.01
6.
Auto electronics patents
0.91*
0.45*
7.
Total auto patents
0.80*
0.29*
8.
Dominant design
0.78*
-0.06
Note. Correlation for non-interacting independent variables is not reported.
* p < 0.05.

the top fifteen patenting firms: five automakers (General
Motors, Toyota, Ford, Nissan, and Honda) and ten component suppliers (Engelhard, W.R. Grace, Corning, Nippondenso, EMITEC GmBH, NGK insulators, Robert Bosch,
Universal Oil Production Company, Hitachi, and SIEMENS).
5. RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for variables used to test the hypotheses. Table
2 shows that some variables are highly correlated. High
correlations among variables are known to cause significant muliticollinearity; thus, bias regression estimates
(Kennedy, 1985). To ensure that our regressions do not
suffer from potential multicollinearity problems, we calculated the variable inflation factor (VIF) for all regression
model specifications. None of the calculated VIFs was
found to be higher than 10, which indicates that regression
models in this study do not suffer from harmful collinearity
(Kennedy, 1985).
10
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3

4

5

6

7

0.26*
-0.27*
0.79*
0.40*
0.22*

-0.54*
0.49*
0.53*
0.85*

-0.45*
-0.35*
-0.62*

0.75*
0.53*

0.64*

Table 3 and 4 reports results of tests for hypotheses.
Table 3 reports regression results using the pooled dataset
while table 4 reports regression results using the panel dataset. We also report log likelihoods (table 3) and chisquares (table 4) at the bottom of the table.
For both table 3 and table 4, model 1 and model 2
show the regression results using product innovation (i.e.,
the level of overall product innovation) as the dependent
variable. Similarly, model 3 through model 6 display the
regression results using proportion of component innovations (i.e., catalyst technologies as ‘preceding’ core component and electronics technologies as ‘subsequent’ core
component) as the dependent variables. For table 3, model
7 and model 8 show the results using innovating firm concentration as the dependent variable. In both tables (table 3
and table 4), dominant design and time trend are predictor
variables; and auto sales, expenditures, total auto patents
and auto electronics patents are control variables. In particular, auto electronics patents are specially added in
model 6 to control for potential impact that patenting in
overall automotive electronics may have on firm patenting
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Table 3
Pooled regression results.
Dependent variables

Dominant design
Time trend
3

Log (Auto sales (1/10 ))
Log (Expenditure)
Auto electronics patents (1/103)
Total auto patents (1/103)
Intercept

Product innovation
Model 1
Model 2
1970-1983
1970-1994
YrDD +2

Proportion of subsystem technology
Model 6
1970-1994

Innovating firm concentration
Model 7
Model 8
1970-1983
1970-1994
YrDD +2

0.27*** (0.10)

-0.19** (0.08)

-0.29*** (0.10)

0.02** (0.01)

-0.03*** (0.01)

0.04**** (0.01)

0.05*** (0.01)

-0.01 (0.01)

0.17 (0.19)
-0.02 (0.03)

0.08 (0.11)
0.005 (0.02)

-0.03 (0.12)
0.03* (0.02)
-1.42 (1.23)

-0.02 (0.05)
0.01 (0.01)

0.003 (0.01)
-0.002*
(0.001)
-0.02 (0.03)
0.01 (0.01)

-0.68 (0.97)

-1.36**** (0.29)

0.39 (0.63)

0.23**** (0.02)

2.03** (0.83)
-0.02 (0.10)

0.60 (0.65)
-0.06 (0.14)

-0.27 (0.57)
-0.45 (1.91)

-0.66** (0.31)
3.02* (1.75)

0.05 (0.08)
0.72** (0.33)

0.03 (0.12)
0.12 (0.41)

-0.31** (0.10)
0.25 (0.26)

0.21 (0.26)

-0.02 (0.03)
0.1 (0.14)

-0.03 (0.02)
0.11 (0.07)

624
15.18

1429
19.28

1429
25.74

1429
23.84

624
32.5

1429
65.98

N
624
1429
Log Likelihood
-48.72
-95.53
YrDD (the year the dominant design in AECS technology emerged) = 1981.
* p-Value < 0.1, two-tailed tests.
** p-Value < 0.05, two-tailed tests.
*** p-Value < 0.01, two-tailed tests.
**** p-Value < 0.001, two-tailed tests.
Table 4
Panel Regression Results
Dependent variables

Model 4
1970-1994

Digital Controls
Model 5
1970-1994

Catalyst
Model 3
1970-1983
YrDD +2
0.27**** (0.03)
-0.19****
(0.03)
-0.13 (0.16)
-0.02 (0.02)

Product innovation
Model 1
1970-1983
YrDD +2

Proportion of subsystem technology
Model 2
1970-1994

Catalyst
Model 3
1970-1983
YrDD +2

Model 4
1970-1994

Digital Controls
Model 5
1970-1994

Model 6
1970-1994

Dominant design

0.2 (0.94)

-1.38* (0.29)

0.05 (0.03)

0.03 (0.02)

-0.02* (0.01)

-0.03** (0.10)

Time trend

-0.18 (0.64)

0.26**** (0.04)

-0.03 (0.03)

-0.002 (0.002)

0.005*** (0.002)

0.004*** (0.001)

1.70** (0.76)
0.09 (0.08)

0.71 (0.62)
0.03 (0.08)

-0.02 (0.04)
0.002 (0.004)

0.02 (0.02)
0.001 (0.004)

0.02 (0.02)
0.0005 (0.004)

0.003 (0.01)
0.002 (0.004)
-0.13* (0.08)

2.85* (1.61)
-5.24*** (1.76)

-1.01 (0.74)
-0.67 (1.13)

0.06 (0.06)
0.004 (0.05)

0.003 (0.05)
-0.03 (0.03)

-0.04* (0.02)
0.01 (0.03)

0.01 (0.03)

210
8.23

375
11.70**

375
10.74*

375
10.98*

3

Log (Auto sales (1/10 ))
Log (Expenditure)
Auto electronics patents (1/103)
Total auto patents (1/103)
Intercept

201
375
N
20.83***
141.23***
Wald Chi2
YrDD (the year the dominant design in AECS technology emerged) = 1981.
* p-Value < 0.1, two-tailed tests.
** p-Value < 0.05, two-tailed tests.
*** p-Value < 0.01, two-tailed tests.
**** p-Value < 0.001, two-tailed tests.
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behaviors in electronics automotive emissions control
technologies.
In hypothesis1a, we argued that the overall level of
product innovation in an industry is lower immediately
after the emergence of a dominant design for a technological product. To test hypothesis 1a, we examined the coefficient for the dominant design dummy in model 1, table 3
and 4. To operationalize patenting activities immediately
after the emergence of the dominant design, we examined
the coefficient of the dominant design dummy for the first
two years after the emergence of a dominant design (model
1). 5 The coefficient is negative and insignificant for the
regression using the pooled dataset. Similarly, fixed-effects
regression results using the panel dataset (model 1, table 4)
also show that, the dominant design dummy coefficient for
the first two years is insignificant. Consequently, these
findings together disconfirm hypothesis 1a.
In hypothesis 1b, we hypothesized that for a technological product, the overall level of product innovation in
an industry increases over time during the era of incremental change. To test hypothesis 1b, we examined the time
trend variable in model 2, table 3 and 4. The time trend
variable is positive and significant (p <0.001) for model 2
in both the pooled and firm fixed-effects regressions (table
3 and 4). Thus, this finding confirms the hypothesis 1b that
the overall level of product innovation increases over time
after the emergence of a dominant design for a technological product.
In hypothesis 2a, we proposed that the core subsystem,
which became the dominant design accounts for less of an
overall proportion of innovation immediately after the
emergence of a dominant design. To test hypothesis 2a,
similarly we examined the coefficient for the dominant
design variable for the proportion of catalyst subsystem for
the first two years in model 3, table 3 and 4. The catalyst
subsystem is the ‘preceding’ core component. Contrary to
our prediction, the coefficient is positive and this finding is
consistent across the two different dataset (table 3 and 4).
Thus, these findings indicate that the proportion of innovations associated with the preceding core component increased 6 rather than decreased immediately after the emergence of a dominant design. Consequently, there is no
support for hypothesis 2a.
In hypothesis 2b, we hypothesized that for a technological product, the proportion of innovation associated
with the preceding core component (i.e. catalysts) declines
over time during the era of incremental change. To test

6. DISCUSSION

5

Two years was deemed an appropriate amount of time to operationalize
patent applications as a measure for the level of innovation based on the
assumption that it takes roughly 11 months to file a patent application. So
the first year would capture work in anticipation of the dominant design
and the first and second years would capture work immediately following
the dominant design. After two years it is more than two cycles of patenting out from the dominant design, which can no longer be considered
“immediately following.” This is particularly relevant in fast-changing
industries such as digital electronics.
6
Based on the positive and significant (p<0.001) regression coefficient
for the dominant design dummy variable in model 4, table 3.

12

hypothesis 2b, we examined the coefficient for time trend
variable in model 4, table 3 and 4. For the pooled regression (table 3), the coefficient is negative and significant (p
<0.05). However, for the fixed-effects regression (table 4),
the coefficient for the time trend variable is negative as
expected but insignificant. Thus, we argue that hypothesis
2b is weakly supported as there is partially significant support the hypothesis.
In hypothesis 2c, we predicted that for a technological
product, the proportion of innovation associated with a
subsequent core component increase over time during the
era of incremental change. To test hypothesis 2c, we examined the coefficient of the time trend variable for electronics subsystem in model 5 and 6 in both table 3 and 4. The
electronics subsystem is the subsequent core component
during the era of incremental innovation. As predicted, the
time trend variable for electronics subsystem is positive
and significant (p<0.05) for both model 5 and model 6.
Importantly, model 6 has patenting in auto electronics
technology as a control and the time trend variable is still
significant (p <0.05), indicating that this overall increase in
emissions electronics is over and above the trend in automotive electronics in general. This finding is consistent in
both the pooled and fixed-effects regressions. Consequently, there is significant support for hypothesis 2c.
In hypothesis 3a and 3b, we focus on changes in
the innovating firm concentration for a technological product during the era of incremental innovation. In hypothesis
3a, we proposed that the concentration of innovating firms
is higher immediately following the emergence of a dominant design; and to test hypothesis 3a, we examined the
coefficient for the dominant design dummy in model 7,
table 3. As expected, the regression coefficient is positive
and significant (p<0.05), confirming the hypothesis 3a.
Moreover, the time trend variable in model 8 is negative
and significant (p<0.1) confirming the hypothesis 3b,
which predicted that the concentration of innovating firms
in the industry decreases over time in the era of incremental change.
The regression coefficients for control variables, industry capital expenditures, automotive sales and total auto
patents appear to be largely insignificant, suggesting that
controls are only weakly related to overall product innovation or innovation in key subsystem technologies in the
development of automotive emissions control technologies.
Table 5 below is a summary of the models, hypotheses and
findings, followed by a discussion of these results.
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Drawing on existing research into the “era of incremental
change” in technological product lifecycles (Anderson and
Tushman 1990), we develop and test hypotheses that imply
a dynamic model of innovative activity in an industry in a
period of time following the establishment of a dominant
design. This model essentially breaks up this time period
into two segments: (1) the period of time immediately fol-
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Table 5
Summary of findings.
Models and
hypotheses
Model 1 – Level of Product Innovation: Immediately Following Dominant Design
H1a
In a technological product industry, the overall level of product innovation immediately
following the emergence of a dominant design will be lower than the level of product
innovation before the emergence of a dominant design.
Model 2 – Level of Product Innovation: Over Time
H1b
In a technological product industry, the overall level of product innovation increases
over time during the era of incremental change.

Model 3 – Types of Component Innovation: Immediately Following Dominant Design
H2a
In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will account for less
of an overall proportion (or share) of component innovations immediately following the
emergence of a dominant design.
Model 4 – Types of Component Innovation: Over Time
H2b
In a technological product industry, ‘preceding’ core components will account for a
decreasing proportion (or share) of component innovations over time during the era of
incremental change.
Models 5 and 6– Types of Component Innovation: Over Time
H2c
In a technological product, ‘subsequent’ core components will account for an increasing proportion (or share) of component innovations over time during the era of incremental change.

Findings

Not Supported
- Pooled: not supported
- Fixed effects: not supported a

Supported
- Pooled: supported
- Fixed effects: supported

Not Supported
- Pooled: not supported b
- Fixed effects: not supported a

Weakly Supported
- Pooled: supported
- Fixed effects: not supported

Supported
- Pooled: supported
- Fixed effects: supported

Model 7– Concentration of Innovating Firms: Immediately Following Dominant Design
H3a
In a technological product industry, the concentration of firms innovating immediately
following the emergence of a dominant design will be higher than the concentration of
firms innovating before the emergence of a dominant design.

Supported

Model 8 – Concentration of Innovating Firms: Over Time
H3b
In a technological product industry, the concentration of innovating firms decreases
over time during the era of incremental change.

Supported

a
b

The coefficient was in the opposite direction (positive or negative) than hypothesized, but insignificant.
The coefficient was in the opposite direction (positive or negative) than hypothesized and significant.

lowing the establishment of the dominant design (H1a,
H2a, H3a); and (2) over time until the next technological
shift (H1b, H2b, H2c, and H2d). We apply this model to
three different aspects of innovative activity: the level of
overall product innovation; the relative types of component
innovation; and the concentration of innovating firms in
the industry. Findings are mixed for the automotive emission control industry in the period of time immediately
following the standardization on the catalytic converter
design, but they generally support hypotheses over time.
Next we will discuss each of these three aspects of the innovative activity in the era of incremental change and the
implications for research.
6.1. Overall Level of Product Innovation
We expected overall product innovation to pull back after a
dominant design, as certain elements of the product design
are stabilized and firms pursue other avenues for innova13
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tion – avenues that potentially provide more return, such as
manufacturing processes (Klepper and Simon, 1997).
However, we expected this reduced level of product innovation should increase over time. Our findings support the
increase over time, but do not support the pull-back in the
overall level of product innovation in the early years of the
era of incremental change. Thus, overall innovation on
technological products in the era of incremental change
may not be less than during the era of ferment – which is
often implied by many researchers who study technology
life cycles. Of course, one may argue that product innovations after a dominant design are smaller and more incremental – less radical than those before the dominant design.
This is certainly the case to some extent – because architectures are stabilized so the innovative activity on an architectural level is diminished in favor of modular innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990). However, these modular, or within-component / subsystem innovations are not
necessarily minor – and many of the manufacturing tech-
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nologies and other areas of innovation may require complementary product improvements. For example, in his
study of Rolls Royce’s aircraft engine manufacturing,
Prencipe (1997) found that after the dominant design was
established, there was intense investment in a variety of
interrelated innovations for the next 15 years in materials,
component designs, and manufacturing processes, which
were all complementary. New alloys enabled the wide
chord fan blade, for example, which required new manufacturing processes (Prencipe, 1997). Such interrelated,
complementary product innovations only become more
intense in situations that evolve the evolution of digital
technologies such as digital controls. Digital control innovation brings with it a higher degree of interdependency
with other components when compared to non-digital sorts
of controls (such as hydraulic engine control systems, Brusoni et al., 2001). Further, digital technologies are programmable and generative (Yoo et al., 2010) which allows
for interactions and complementarities across the entire
product architecture outside of the modular interfaces between architectural components (Lee and Berente, 2012).
These innovative elements of digital technologies can be
important to innovation during the time frame of our study
– it is precisely this time period where electronics innovations transformed the automotive industry (King and Lyytinen, 2005). We controlled for automotive electronics in
our analysis (as well as a variety of other variables – including automotive innovation overall), and our results
clearly appear to indicate that the stage in a technology’s
life cycle may not matter to overall innovation in quite the
way others have thought in the past. These results are more
in line with those studies that found the era of incremental
change to be abundant with impactful innovation (Prencipe
1997; Murmann and Frenken 2006; Funk 2009; Lee et al
2011; Dokko et al 2012). The question then became – what
was the composition of this innovative period of time? We
addressed this question by exploring the relative types of
component innovation in automotive emissions.
6.2. Types of Component Innovation
The automotive emissions control industry provided a particularly valuable sample because there are fundamentally
only two types of components: those associated with the
catalyst, and those associated with digital controls. The
catalyst was the sole core component before the emergence
of the dominant design (what we describe as ‘preceding’
core component) – and during this time digital controls
were peripheral. After the dominant design emerged, digital controls also became core to the innovative activity in
automotive emissions. When a component goes from peripheral to core over time, we refer to this as a ‘subsequent’
core component (in relation to the ‘preceding’ core component). Thus our two sets of components enable us to
isolate the relative patterns of movement associated with
preceding and subsequent core components.
Although the movement of innovative activity from
certain core components to others has been characterized in
14
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the literature (Tushman and Rosenkopf 1993; Prencipe
2000; Murmann and Frenken 2006), there is no broad empirical analysis showing how this happens over the course
of the era of incremental change. The literature indicates
that after a dominant design the relative magnitude of innovative activity would focus on more diverse product
components (Henderson and Clark 1990; Anderson and
Tushman 1990), implying that the overall proportion of
preceding core component innovation would diminish immediately following the dominant design. Our findings do
not support and actually contradict these expectations. The
relative share of innovative activity on preceding core
components does not diminish immediately after the dominant design – but does diminish (as a relative proportion of
overall innovation) over time. This finding implies that
core components may not necessarily become less important to innovative activity once a product architecture is
stabilized because firms maintain knowledge across components even as overall product structures stabilize
(Prencipe et al., 2003). However, although the proportion
of innovation on preceding core components does not diminish immediately following the dominant design (quite
the contrary – it increases!), it does account for relatively
less of the overall product innovation over time, just as the
subsequent core components account for more over time.
This finding supports the idea that firms shift their innovative attention from previous to subsequent core components over time after the emergence of a dominant design.
These findings are consistent with expectations that firms
focus on more diverse components over time (Henderson
and Clark, 1990; Anderson and Tushman, 1990) and that
firms generally need to maintain competencies across a
variety of components (Brusoni et al., 2001). Of course,
this composition of innovating activities in an industry will
have some relationship to the concentration of firms in that
industry, which we will discuss next.
6.3. Concentration of Innovating Firms
In our findings, there was a higher concentration of innovating firms immediately following the emergence of a
dominant design – a finding consistent with the idea of an
industry “shake-out” where the winners in the innovation
battle remain and the losers depart the industry (Klepper
1996; Utterback and Suarez 1993; Suarez 2003). Over time,
however, due to the stabilization and resulting certainty
associated with the product architecture, this concentration
diminishes as new entrants make increasing impacts on the
product (Funk 2009). Two factors can explain this increase.
First, dominant designs inevitably increase the degree of
modularity of a technology product – even if that product
is not entirely modular – and therefore one would expect
the patterns of innovative activity following a dominant
design to be consistent with the literature on modular innovations (Argyres and Bigelow, 2010). This finding is consistent with the work that identifies specific conditions
when industry shakeout does not occur over time – these
include situations that are quite consistent with the modu-
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larity argument, but do not focus on product architectures,
and instead focus on industry effects such as “vertical separation” of appropriability (Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2001)
and degree of partitioning in the network (Bonaccorsi and
Giuri 2000). Second, in this case the subsequent core components involve digital technologies. Digital technologies
require different capabilities for their design and development – including capabilities involving software programming – from the sorts of things incumbent firms have done
in the past (Brusoni et al 2001; Yoo et al., 2012). Clearly
many of these new capabilities will be provided by new
entrants to previously non-digital industries such as the
automotive industry in the 1980s.
7. CONCLUSION
The era of incremental change in a technological product’s
life cycle may not be as ‘uninteresting’ as it is often characterized in the literature. In this research, we take a step
towards unpacking the patterns of innovative activity in
this period of time that follows the emergence of a dominant design. Although in certain areas the era of incremental change behaves as expected – like with the initial
shake-out of the industry and eventual decrease in concentration of innovators following the dominant design – in
other areas findings may be surprising. For example, the
overall level of product innovation did not decrease after
the dominant design – nor did the relative attention to core
components. This is a step we take – along with a handful
other recent studies (e.g., Funk, 2009; Dokko et al., 2012)
in paying more attention to the era of incremental change.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research benefited from the support of the National
Science Foundation (NSF #522190), the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP), and the Center for the Study
and Improvement of Regulation (CSIR) at Carnegie
Mellon University. We would like to thank Francisco Veloso, David Hounshell, Edward Rubin, David Gerard, and
Amrit Tiwana for their helpful comments.
REFERENCES
Abernathy, W. J., Utterback, J. M., 1978. Patterns of Industrial
Innovation. Technology Review 80, 40-47.
Acs, Z. J., Anselin, L., Varga, A., 2002. Patents and innovation
counts as measures of regional production of new knowledge.
Research Policy 31, 1069-1085.
Almeida, P. J., Song, J., Grant, R., 2002. Are firms superior to
alliances and markets? An empirical test of cross-border
knowledge building. Organization Science 13, 147-161.
Anderson, J. F., Sherwood, T., 2002. Comparison of EPA and
other estimates of mobile source rule costs to actual prices
changes. SAE 2002-01-1980, Washington, DC.

15

DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2013

Anderson, P., Tushman, M. L., 1990. Technological discontinuities and dominant designs: a cyclical model of technological
change. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 604-633.
Argyres, N., Bigelow, L., 2010. Innovation, modularity, and vertical deintegration: evidence from the early U.S. auto industry. Organization Science 21:842-853.
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A., Gambardella, A., 2001. Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy, MIT Press, 2001.
Arundel, A., Kabla, I., 1998. What percentage of innovations are
patented? empirical estimates for european firms. Research
Policy 27, 127-141.
Baldwin, C. Y., Clark, K.B., 1997. Managing in an age of modularity. Harvard Business Review 75, 84-93.
Bonaccorsi, A., Giuri, P., 2001. The long-term evolution of vertically-related industries. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 19, 1053-1083.
Bonaccorsi, A., Giuri, P., 2000. When shakeout doesn't occur:
The evolution of the turboprop engine industry. Research
Policy 29, 847-870.
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A., Pavitt, K., 2001. Knowledge specialization, organizational coupling, and the boundaries of the firm:
why do firms know more than they make? Administrative
Science Quarterly 46, 597-612.
Campbell, R. S., Levine, L. O., 1984. Technology Indicators
Based on Patent Data: Three Case Studies, Battelle Pacific
Northwest Laboratory.
CARB, 1996. Low-Emission Vehicle and Zero-Emission Vehicle
Program Review. Sacramento, CA, Mobile Division, California Air Resource Board.
Christensen, C. M., Suarez, F. F., Utterback, J. M., 1998. Strategies for survival in fast-changing industries. Management
Science 44, S207-S220.
Clark, K. B., 1985. The interaction of design hierarchies and
market concepts in technological evolution. Research Policy
14, 235-251.
Constant, E. W., 1987. The social locus of technological practice:
community, system, or organization? In: Bijker, W. E.,
Hughes, T. P., Pinch, T. (Eds.), The Social Construction of
Technological Systems. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press.
Cooper, A. C., Schendel, D., 1976. Strategic responses to technological threats. Business Horizons 19, 61-69.
Dexter, D., 1979. Case Study of the Innovation Process Characterizing the Development of the Three-way Catalytic Converter System. Lexington Technology Associates. Lexington,
MA,
Dokko, G., Aigam, A., Rosenkopf, L., 2012. Keeping steady as
she goes: a negotiated order perspective on technological
evolution, Organization Studies 33, 681-703
Doyle, J., 2000. Taken for A Ride. Four Walls Eight Windows.
New York.
EPA, 1990. Environmental Investiments: The Cost Of a Clean
Environment, United States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-230-1 1-90-083.
Funk, J. 2009. Components, systems and discontinuities: the case
of magnetic recording and playback equipment. Research
Policy 38, 1192-1202.
Greaker, M., 2006. Spillovers in the development of new technology: a new look at the Porter hypothesis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 411-420.
Greaker, M., Rosendahl, K. E., 2008. Environmental policy with
upstream pollution abatement technology firms. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 56, 246-259.

ANALYSIS OF THE AUTOMOTIVE EMISSION CONTROL INDUSTRY | J. LEE and N. BERENTE

Griliches, Z. 1990. Patent statistics as economic indicators: A
survey. Journal of Economic Literature 28,1661-1707.
Hall, B. 2005. A note on the bias in Herfindahl-type measures
based on count data. Revue d'Économie Industrielle, 110,
149-156.
Hausman, J., Hall, B. H., Griliches, Z., 1984. Econometric models for count data with an application to the patents - R&D
relationship. Econometrica 52, 909-938.
Heck, R. M., Farrauto, R. J., 2002. Catalytic Air Pollution Control: Commercial Technology. New York, NY; John Wiley
& Sons, Inc.
Henderson, R. M., Clark, K. B., 1990. Architectural innovation:
the recognition of existing product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science Quarterly
35, 9-30.
Hughes, T. P., 1987. The evolution of large technological systems.
In: W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, Pinch, T., The Social Construction of Technological System. Cambridge, MA, The
MIT Press.
Iansiti, M., 1998. Technology Integration. Boston, MA, Harvard
Business School Press.
Iansiti, M., Khanna, T., 1995. Technological evolution, system
architecture and the obsolescence of firm capabilities. Industrial and Corporate Change 4, 333-361.
Katila, R., 2000. New product search over time: Past ideas in
their prime? Academy of Management Journal 45, 995-1010.
Kaplan, S., Tripsas, M., 2008. Thinking about technology: applying a cognitive lens to technical change. Research Policy 37,
790-805.
Kennedy, P., 1985. A Guide to Econometric Methods. Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press.
Kerr, W., Shihe, F., 2008. The survey of industrial R&D - patent
database link project. The Journal of Technology Transfer,
33, 173-186.
King, J.L., K. Lyytinen. 2005. Automotive informatics: Information technology and enterprise transformation in the automobile industry. In: W.H. Dutton, B. Kahin, R.
O’Callaghan, A.W. Wychoff, (Eds.), Transforming Enterprise: The Economic and Social Implications of Information
Technology. MIT Press, Boston, MA.
Klepper S., Simons K.,1997. Technological extinctions of industrial firms: an inquiry into their nature and causes. Industrial
and Corporate Change, 6, 379-460.
Klepper, S. 1996. Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the
product life cycle. The American Economic Review 86, 562583.
Lee, J., Berente, N., 2012. Digital innovation and the division of
innovative labor: digital controls in the automotive industry.
Organization Science, Forthcoming
Lee, J., Veloso, F. M., Hounshell, D., 2011. Linking induced
technological change, and environmental regulation: Evidence from patenting in the U.S. auto industry. Research
Policy.
McCullagh, P., Melder, J. A., 1989. Generalized Linear Models
(2nd eds). Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Mondt, J. R., 2000. Cleaner Cars: The History and Technology of
Emission Control Since the 1960s, Society of Automotive
Engineers.
Murmann J. P., Frenken K., 2006. Toward a systematic framework for research on dominant design, technological innovations, and industrial change. Research Policy 35, 925-952
Mueller, D. C., Tilton, J. E., 1969. Research and development
costs as a barrier to entry. The Canadian Journal of Economics 2, 570-579.

16

DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2013

NESCAUM, 2000. Environmental Regulation and Technology
Innovation: Controlling Mercury Emissions from Coal-Fired
Boilers, Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management.
Pavitt, K. 1985. Patent statistics as indicators of innovative activities: possibilities and problem. Scientometrics, 7, 77-99.
Penner-Hahn J., Shaver J. M., 2004. Does international research
and development increase patent output? An analysis of Japanese pharmaceutical firms. Strategic Management Journal
26, 121-140
Prencipe, A. 1997. Technological competencies and product's
evolutionary dynamics: a case study from the aero-engine
industry. Research Policy 25, 1261-1276.
Prencipe, A. 2000. Breadth and depth of technological capabilities in CoPS: the case of the aircraft engine control system.
Research Policy 29, 895-911.
Prencipe, A., Davies, A., Hobday, M., 2003. The Business of
Systems Integration, Oxford University Press.
Scherer, F. M. 1983. The propensity to patent. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1, 107-128.
Suarez, F. F., Utterback, J. M., 1995. Dominant designs and the
survival of firms. Strategic Management Journal 16, 415-430.
Suarez, F. F., 2004. Battles for technological dominance: an integrative framework. Research Policy 33, 271-286.
Trajtenberg, M., 1989. The welfare analysis of product innovations with an application to computed tomography scanners.
Journal of Political Economy 97, 444-479.
Tushman, M. L., Anderson, P., 1986. Technological discontinuities and organizational environments. Administrative Science Quarterly 31, 439-465.
Tushman, M., Murmann, J. P., 2002. Dominant designs, technology cycles and organizational outcomes. In: Garud, R., Kumaraswamy, A., Langlois, R. N., Malden, M. A., Managing
in the Modular Age: Architectures, Networks, and Organizations., Blackwell.
Tushman, M., Rosenkopf, L., 1992. Organizational determinants
of technological change: toward a sociology of technological
evolution. Research in Organizational Behavior 14, 311-347.
Utterback, J. M., Suarez, F. F., 1993. Innovation, competition and
industry structure. Research Policy 22. 1-21.
Ward's Auto, 2010. Ward's Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures.
Ward's Communications. Southfield, MI.
Yoo, J., Henfridsson, O., Lyytinen, K., 2010. Research commentary – the new orga- nizing logic of digital innovation: an
agenda for information systems research. Information Systems Research 21, 724–735.
Yoo, J., Boland Jr., R.J., Lyytinen, K., Majchrzak, A., 2012. Organizing for innovation in the digitized world. Organization
Science 23, 1398–1408.

